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Abstract—In practice there are deficiencies in precise inter-
team communications about system anomalies to perform trou-
bleshooting and postmortem analysis along different teams op-
erating complex IoT systems. We evaluate the quality in use
of an adaptation of IEEE Std. 1044-2009 with the objective to
differentiate the handling of fault detection and fault reaction
from handling of defect and its options for defect correction.
We extended the scope of IEEE Std. 1044-2009 from anomalies
related to software only to anomalies related to complex IoT
systems. To evaluate the quality in use of our classification a
study was conducted at Robert Bosch GmbH. We applied our
adaptation to a postmortem analysis of an IoT solution and
evaluated the quality in use by conducting interviews with three
stakeholders. Our adaptation was effectively applied and inter-
team communications as well as iterative and inductive learning
for product improvement were enhanced. Further training and
practice are required.
Index Terms—anomaly, failure, fault, defect, complex system,
classification
I. INTRODUCTION
Providers of cloud-based IoT solutions compile distributed
complex systems of components, integrating hardware, soft-
ware and mechanical system elements. In operations they
aim for controlling their dynamic behaviour in a permanently
changing context of use. The system components are devel-
oped and operated by different teams from different organiza-
tional units. The teams are often specialized in the context of
their component and their organizational silo. Communication
within an organizational silo and the teams is performed by
applying concepts that are optimized for their specific intra-
team context.
In case of failure, a failed function of an IoT service, the
different teams operating the system components, have to form
a collective to collaboratively control the situation.
First, in situation management (troubleshooting), facing
dynamics, the objective is to regain control as quickly as
possible with fault reactions. The purpose of fault reaction is
to avoid a failure influencing customer satisfaction or, if not
successful, at least to provide limited operation for keeping
the customer’s trust by controlling the situation.
Second, once the system is transitioned back into a
controlled state, the anomaly in the effect chain and the
actions of responding to dynamic cascades of consecutive
anomalies are investigated within a postmortem analysis. The
objective is to detect defects and subsequently remove them.
Each of the two sets of activities, situation management and
postmortem analysis follow different optimization goals.
First, detection of service failure initiates tactical actions
performed with the goal of customer satisfaction. The leading
principle is to ’be effective before efficient’.
Second, the subsequent analysis to identify defects and
options for correction initiates strategical actions performed
with the goal of profitability. The leading principle is to ’be
efficient’.
To perform situation management and postmortem analy-
sis several development and operational teams from differ-
ent organizational silos form a collective1. Deficiencies on
shared concepts for communication about anomalies often lead
to misunderstandings and different interpretations regarding
anomalies. Missing shared concepts on anomalies for inter-
team communications across organizational silos can be used
to direct “responsibility” for failure, its compensation and
related defect correction to a specific organizational unit [1].
Assigning blame to a specific organizational unit can be
intensified by performing root cause analysis, for example by
asking 5xWhy [2]. While doing this, people tend to search
for isolated individual causes. In retrospective, humans strive
to oversimplify causal chains to a single root cause without
embracing complexity and dynamics in cause effect chains [3].
As stated by Cook [4] for distributed complex systems there
might be no isolated root cause. Rather, there are multiple
faults and contributors, where each fault is necessary but they
are only jointly sufficient for failure [4]. Asking “why” tends
to point in the direction of “who”. This oversimplification to
a single root cause and a single responsibility often results in
a culture of blaming.
In contrast, a retrospective is an instrument of a learning
organization performing feedback cycles to improve product
and service quality as well as organization quality [5]–[7].
The feedback cycles process defects related to product and
service quality and defects related to the performance of
the organization.
1Set of diverse participants to persist in complex domains.
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If the differentiation of effective tactical work mode from
efficient strategic work mode is missing, an organization tends
to remain in effective tactical mode. If a failure can be
controlled only by tactical fault reactions, an interest in the
defect and its sustainable correction often remains secondary.
Therefore, defects with their options for correction are not
listed and accumulate to technical debts.
To address this need for a precise differentiation and to
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the collaboration
capabilities of developers, operators and organizations, we
propose a shared classification for anomalies. This work is
based on the common logical concept of the IEEE Std. 1044-
2009 [8] to classify software anomalies.
We propose an adaptation of the IEEE Std. 1044-2009
applied only to system element software to extend the same for
application to a system composed of a set of interacting system
elements. This enables differentiation between the handling of
fault detection and dynamic fault reactions from the handling
of defect and its options for sustainable defect correction, not
only on system element software but generally on system level.
We investigated its quality in use [9] by conducting a
case study with two stages. In the first stage we applied
our adaptation of the IEEE Std. 1044-2009 to a postmortem
analysis and present the results of the classification. To further
evaluate the quality in use of our adaptation, we conducted
semi-structured interviews with three of the stakeholders of
the postmortem analysis.
The remaining part of this work is organised as follows:
The objective of this work – the evaluation of the quality
in use of our adaptation of the IEEE Std. 1044-2009 to
differentiate between the handling of fault and fault reaction
from the handling of defect and its options for defect
correction – are presented in Section II-A. We further explain
the methodology of the two-staged case approach that we
use to evaluate our adaptation. In Section III we give an
overview of related work in the areas of classification for
anomalies and postmortem analysis. The concepts of this
work are presented in Section IV and include a system
definition with three architectural views: functional system
view, dynamic system view and system structure view.
In addition, we introduce the concepts used in IEEE Std.
1044-2009: problem, failure, fault and defect. Based on
our three system views, we propose our adaptation of the
concepts fault and defect and further introduce the concept
of fault tolerance and situation management as well as
defect correction and quality management. In Section V, we
illustrate the results of our case study on the quality in use
of our adaptation and conclude the paper with a discussion
of implications as well as limitations and propose future work.
II. SCOPE AND RESEARCH METHOD
To structure our research, we applied the case study research
process as proposed by Runeson and Hoest [10]. With the case
study we addressed the following research goal.
A. Research Goal
The goal of this study is to evaluate the quality in use (with
limitation to the quality sub-characteristics: effectiveness, ef-
ficiency and satisfaction) of an adaptation of the Standard
Classification for Software Anomalies, the IEEE 1044-2009,
by applying it to a postmortem analysis of an IoT System.
As part of our adaptation, we have extended the scope of
IEEE Std. 1044-2009 from anomalies related to software only
to anomalies related to complex IoT systems providing service
to a customer.
We differentiate between the handling of:
• first, fault detection and fault reaction
in the context of situation management from
• second, defect and its options for defect correction
in the context of defect management.
This work is intended to enhance effectiveness and
efficiency of the collaboration capabilities between developers,
operators along organizational units by providing common
logical concepts of anomalies. The concepts of anomalies
enable precise inter-team communication to differentiate
between actions for controlling the system and actions for its
sustainable correction.
For evaluation of the quality in use with its quality sub-
characteristics effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction the
following definitions are presented and interpreted for the
context of this work.
According to ISO/IEC 25022 [9] quality in use is the:
“degree to which a product or system can be used by specific
users to meet their needs to achieve specific goals with
effectiveness, efficiency, satisfaction, and freedom from risk
in specific contexts of use”. For the context of this work, we
focus on the sub-characteristics of effectiveness, efficiency and
satisfaction as defined in ISO/IEC 25022 [9].
• Effectiveness: “Accuracy and completeness with which
users achieve specified goals” [11]. We evaluate the
accuracy of differentiating the handling of fault detection
and fault reaction from the handling of defect detection
and its defect correction option(s), according to our
adapted classification. The evaluation of the completeness
in distinguishing the anomalies is not necessary due to
an unlimited amount of possible defects as described in
Section V-D.
• Efficiency: “Resources expended in relation to the ac-
curacy and completeness with which users achieve
goals” [11]. Resources include temporal and also mental
effort performing the task. Since we performed qualitative
research we did not track time consumption measure-
ments. We therefore qualitatively evaluated the estimated
efficiency of the interview participants in comparison to
other postmortem analyses.
• Satisfaction: “Degree to which user needs are satisfied
when a product or system is used in a specified context
of use” [9]. We evaluated this characteristic by asking
the interview participants about their subjective opinions
and attitude towards applying the classification.
B. Case Context
We evaluate the quality in use of the classification for
system anomalies in a case study conducted in 2019 at Robert
Bosch GmbH, a German company providing IoT solutions.
The case study is based on a postmortem analysis related
to a customer problem in the domain of IoT condition moni-
toring. We designed the case study in a two-staged procedure.
In stage 1, we applied the adapted classification on a real-
world postmortem analysis of the IoT solution. In stage 2, we
performed semi-structured interviews to evaluate the quality
in use of our concept with the stakeholders of the postmortem
analysis.
C. Stage 1 Application - Data Collection and Analysis
The data collection and analysis of stage one was conducted
between February and May 2019 in the case company. In this
stage specialists, representing the stakeholders interest formed
a collective to perform postmortem analysis. For analysis, the
method of 5xWhy was executed to assign root causes. Selected
stakeholders of the collective applied our classification for
anomalies to enable intra-collective communications.
The data collection technique can be determined as
first degree where two of the researchers were in direct
relation to the case company. One researcher acted as coach
to ensure the application of our classification during the
postmortem analysis. The second researcher took the role of
an independent observer. For data triangulation reasons, we
included data from multiple sources by collecting incident
report data, notes from postmortem analysis meetings,
observations and mails discussing the classification for
anomalies. As the data is sensitive it is not provided with this
work.
We analysed the data by performing data triangulation [12].
By member checking, the results were revised by the
stakeholders of the postmortem analysis and have been
simplified for the purpose of this article in Section V-C.
D. Stage 2 Quality in Use Interviews - Data Collection and
Analysis
To further evaluate the quality in use of the proposed
classification for anomalies, we performed semi-structured
interviews with one participant of each stakeholder group of
the postmortem analysis. The interviews aim to explore the
individual experiences of the interviewees and to qualitatively
evaluate the quality in use of our classification. All of the
interviewees were actively involved during the postmortem
analysis and are responsible for the resulting classification.
The stakeholders include the product manager (S1) of the
IoT solution, a quality manager of the cloud infrastructure
provider (S2) and a systems analyst and quality expert (S3),
who has coached the other stakeholders in applying the
classification (see Table I). All of the three interviewees are
employees of the company.
TABLE I
INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION
SID Role Focus in the Analysis
S1 Product Manager of IoT Solution Representing customer perspective
S2 Quality Manager of Cloud Provider Lessons learned
S3 Quality Expert Consultant Systems analysis
*SID = Stakeholder ID
For semi-structuring the interviews, we created an interview
guide [13]. The interview guide is structured as follows:
• general questions about classifications for anomalies
• main blocks about the effectiveness, efficiency and satis-
faction of the application of our classification for anoma-
lies
• open questions to discover the pros and cons of our
classification
• open question to identify potential for optimization.
We loosely followed the questions and audio recorded the
three face-to-face interviews of approximately 40 minutes,
which were all held in German. After transcribing, we sent
the interviews to the participants for review.
For evaluating the quality in use of the classification, we
analysed the semi-structured interviews by performing
Mayring’s approach of qualitative content analysis [14]. We
performed a mixed approach of deductive and inductive
coding by encoding the transcripts with the predefined
quality in use criteria of Section II-A and creating further
categories for contents which could not be directly assigned
to the existing categories. The transcripts were analyzed on
a sentence level. During analysis, we formed hierarchies of
codes and sub-codes. Through several iterations, the codes
were revised, spilt or merged. The results of the interviews
are described in Section V-E.
III. RELATED WORK
To provide context to this study, the related work investi-
gates classifications for anomalies, as well as the method of
postmortem for analysing service disruptions and investigating
the handling of anomalies.
A. Classifications for anomalies
According to Wagner [15] there are several anomaly and de-
fect classifications with different purposes, e.g. to enhance the
identification of defects or the education of developers. One of
them is even an IEEE standard, the IEEE Std. 1044-2009 [8]
classifying software anomalies. The standard introduces the
different concepts of problem, failure, fault and defect. The
IEEE Std. 1044-2009 is the basis for our classification, there-
fore we introduce it in detail in Section IV-A.
An application of the IEEE Std. 1044-2009 can be found
in the case study of Mellegard et al. [16], within the context
of automotive software development. The authors focused on
the recognition and analysis of the defects. In contrast to their
work, we aim to differentiate between the handling of fault
detection and fault reaction from the handling of defect and
its options for defect correction.
Another widespread classification for anomalies is the tax-
onomy of dependable and secure computing by Avizienis et al.
[17]. The authors address the threats to dependability and se-
curity by the concepts of failure, error and fault. Additionally,
Avizienis et al. apply fault tolerance techniques by handling
errors and faults. The classification of this work has several
symmetries to the classification of Avizienis et al. It is possible
to roughly map their concepts of failure, error and fault to the
concepts of failure, fault and defect of this work. The main
difference of the concept of defect of this work to their concept
of fault is that they consider the fault in a static system view
as well as in a dynamic system view and do not differentiate
between them.
B. Postmortems
With the concept of postmortems, critical service
disruptions are analyzed in retrospective with a focus
on how well the organization responded and recovered
from the disruption. Postmortems are an essential part of
Google’s discipline of Site Reliability Engineering [18], that
is increasingly being used in various companies [1]. Part of
the approach of postmortems is the concept of root cause
analysis (RCA) [18]. RCA aims to identify the root of a
an anomaly and also why it was introduced. Thereby, RCA
targets to prevent similar causes from being introduced in the
future [15]. As we refer to the work of Cook [4], who asserts
that there is no root cause in complex system, with this work,
we try to avoid the concept of searching for single causing
entity, but rather to identify defects with their correction
options.
IV. CONCEPTS
In this section, we introduce the concepts of anomalies,
applied in our classification. We provide a system definition
and present the concepts of the IEEE Standard Classification
for Software Anomalies [8] and our adaptation for complex
systems providing IoT services. Furthermore, we introduce the
concept of fault tolerance and situation management, where
we focus on the relationship between fault and failure to keep
the system in a controlled state. We complete this section
by presenting the concept of defect correction and quality
management, where we focus on the relationship between
fault and defect for sustainable defect correction, optimized
for strategic interest.
A. Classification for Anomalies
The IEEE Std. 1044-2009 is a standard which provides a
unified approach to classify software anomalies and models
the relation between software anomalies and maintenance
activities [8]. Our adaptation of the concepts of the IEEE
Std. 1044-2009 is general enough to cover not only software
but also anomalies related to complex IoT systems. A system
in this work is defined by its components, compiled into
a structural arrangement interacting in component-effect
relationships. The components itself are composed of
interacting system elements such as software, hardware,
mechanics, humans, procedures, etc. [19].
We present the concepts of software anomalies of IEEE
Std. 1044-2009 [8] and differentiate our concepts applicable
to complex systems providing IoT services.
• Problem: Difficulty or uncertainty experienced by one or
more persons, resulting from an unsatisfactory encounter
with a system in use.
• Failure: An event in which a system or system compo-
nent does not perform a required function within specified
limits. (adapted from ISO/IEC 24765:2009 [20])
• Fault: A manifestation of an error in software. (adapted
from ISO/IEC 24765:2009 [20])
• Defect: An imperfection or deficiency in a work product
where that work product does not meet its requirements
or specifications and needs to be either repaired or
replaced. (adapted from the Project Management
Institute [21])
Fig. 1. Relationships modeled as an entity relationship diagram (adapted
from [8])
The relationships between the different concepts are shown
in Figure 1. Further the IEEE Std. 1044-2009 [8] depicts
the relationship between the concepts fault and defect as
follows:
“A fault is a subtype of the supertype defect. Every fault is
a defect, but not every defect is a fault. A defect is a fault if
it is encountered during software execution (thus causing a
failure). A defect is not a fault if it is detected by inspection or
static analysis and removed prior to executing the software.”
For developing and operating complex IoT systems three
architectural views are motivated. ”A view is a representation
of a whole system from the perspective of a related set of
concerns” [22] .
• System structure view: The system structure view
presents the components in their structural arrangement.
The system structure view is optimized to organize the
division of labour.
• Functional system view: The functional view breaks
down the customer function into sub-functions that can be
assigned to the system components. The functional sys-
tem view is optimized to represent the value proposition
to the customer.
• Dynamic system view: The dynamic view represents
the component effect2 relationships in temporal expanse.
The dynamic system view is optimized for situation
management to control the dynamic behaviour.
To avoid conflicts with other concepts of anomalies, we
choose a deductive approach and motivate the concepts of
anomaly out of the system views. The views contain conformi-
ties and nonconformities. We define a nonconformity related
to a system view as an anomaly. The anomalies of IEEE Std.
1044-2009 can be mapped to the anomalies of the three system
views.
• Failure: A failure is a failed function, where a system
does not perform a required function within specified lim-
its. This concept of anomaly is assigned to and optimized
for the functional system view.
• Fault: A fault is a break in a component effect chain
and has a temporal expanse. This concept of anomaly
is assigned to and optimized for the dynamic system
view. A fault can be classified as permanent, transient or
intermittent [23].
• Defect: Whereas the defect in IEEE Std. 1044-2009 is an
imperfection or deficiency in a work product, we assign
the defect to a subset of components in their structural
arrangement and identify potential correction option(s).
Option(s) for correction are related to modification on a:
– subset of components
– component itself
– system element of a component
The trivial correction option is the exchange of the
subset of components the defect is assigned to. An
assignment of correction option(s) to a subset of
components does not imply poor quality of work. The
concept of anomaly defect and its correction option(s) are
assigned to and optimized for the system structure view.
2For this work, component effect relationship is equivalent to cause effect
relationship. A cause is related to a component, therefore we use the concept
of component effect chain.
We adapted the software change request (IEEE 1044-2009)
to a system modification request (SMR)3 [24] assigned to a
subset of components in structural arrangement.
As a fault is a defect, there is a (see Figure 1):
• 1st corrective SMR resulting in a (quick) fault fix and a
• 2nd corrective SMR resulting in a defect correction.
B. Fault Tolerance and Situation Management
Within this section, we focus on the relationship between
the concept fault and concept failure. In engineering complex
IoT systems we aim for fault tolerance: “the ability to deliver
a specified functionality in the presence of one or more
specified faults” [23]. Ideally, a system is designed fault
tolerant. If the system is not tolerant to a fault, we face a
situation: we have to react to keep customer’s trust. Now
time matters. We are bound to time and switch into effective
mode.
Analogous to ISO 26262 – Functional safety – applied in
engineering control systems [23], we differentiate the follow-
ing time stamps and time intervals in the dynamic system
view (see Figure 2).
Time stamps:
• t1: Occurrence of fault, fault is not detected.
• t2: Time when fault is detected.
• t3: End of fault reaction.
• t4: End of fault tolerant time interval. Occurrence of
failure.
Time intervals:
• FTTI (Fault tolerant time interval) is the minimum time
span from the occurrence of a fault in a component-
effect chain of a system (dynamic view) to a possible
occurrence of a failure if the quality mechanism is not
activated.
• FDTI (Fault detection time interval) is the time span from
the occurrence of a fault to its detection.
• FRTI (Fault reaction time interval) is the time span from
the detection of a fault executing a fault reaction until a
transition to a controlled state is achieved.
Fig. 2. Fault tolerant time interval (FTTI) (adapted from [23])
Fault Tolerance: For improving fault tolerance we auto-
mate fault reactions. Fault reaction is performed to prevent the
3For this work, the system modification request includes the software
change request. A SMR in virtual systems focuses on a re-compiled (cor-
rected) structural re-arrangement of a subset of components and not on
modifying system elements of components.
fault from progressing to failure. The fault is detected in FDTI.
Fault reaction is performed in FRTI and has to be successful
before FTTI ends.
Situation management: If the system is not tolerant to
a fault, detecting the fault we switch into a tactical mode
by performing an OODA loop [25]. We Observe, Orient,
Decide and Act (OODA) in the dynamic system view. For
keeping the customer’s trust we demonstrate that we control
the situation. In FTTI, we transfer the system into a controlled
state that is predefined and agreed for customer context of use.
We engineer in having tactical options: we prepare quality
mechanisms, fault reactions which transfer the system into a
controlled state. Controlled states include:
• redundancy activated: no failure in customer con-
text [17].
• degraded: permission to use a service that does not
conform to specified requirements [7] e.g. graceful degra-
dation by serving stale data [26].
• regraded: alteration of the grade of a nonconforming
service in order to make it conform to requirements
differing from the initial requirements (related to value
proposition) [7].
• terminated: preclude usage by controlled take out of
service [7] e.g. isolation. [17]
• compensated: compensation of damages for the cus-
tomer, e.g. in the form of monetary award.
In situation management the customer is watching us
and assesses behaviour and communications and decides to
continue placing trust on us. Collaborating with the customer,
precise communication about anomalies relies on shared
concepts.
If the (quick) fault fix is effective, the system is in a
controlled state. We control the situation. The customer trust
remains placed on us. Now we are independent from time,
we leave the dynamic system view. We switch into efficient
mode. We perform quality management, in particular defect
management in a PDCA loop (Plan, Do, Check, Act) [7].
During a postmortem analysis, improvement for fault reaction
to increase fault tolerance as well as improvement for tactical
options to increase capability for situation management can be
identified and transferred to defect management.
C. Defect Correction and Quality Management (Defect Man-
agement)
Sustainable defect correction, which is optimized for
strategic interest is not equivalent to a (quick) fault fix, which
is optimized for tactical interest. Now, we act in efficient
mode with the goal of profitability.
The lifecycle of a defect is depicted in Figure 3.
In postmortem analysis, we identify anomalies related to the
different system views:
• In the functional system view an anomaly (failure) with
need for correction is identified, a defect is detected and
is to be assigned to system structure view.
Fig. 3. Defect life cycle (adapted from [8])
• In the dynamic system view an anomaly (fault) with the
need for correction is identified, a defect is detected and
is to be assigned to system structure view.
• In the system structure view an anomaly (defect) with
the need for correction is detected and is to be assigned
to a subset of components.
As described in Section IV-A, a defect and its option(s) for
correction are assigned to system structure view and a subset
of components in their structural arrangement. The defect
management decides whether and which defect correction
option, addressed by a SMR, is to be executed for strategic
and efficiency interest.
In Figure 3, we adpated the UML statechart diagram of
the defect life cycle of the IEEE Std. 1044-2009 [8]. The
different states of a defect inserted, detected, removed have
been extended with an additional state graced. We propose,
that after a fault is detected, there is the additional option to
grace a defect for a certain period of time until it is removed.
The decision to grace a defect is based on an assessment that a
defect of an complex IoT system is accepted under following
circumstances:
• The decision can take place due to economical reasons,
when the organization decides to remain in a fault re-
action mode (as described in Section IV-B) instead of
sustainably remove the defect.
• The decision to grace a defect can be influenced by the
assumption that there will be acceptable customer impact.
• The decision to grace a certain defect may be necessary in
the context of a safety vs. security vs. privacy discussion.
For example, a defect from security perspective – a
security defect – may be graced for safety or privacy
reasons.
Nevertheless, defects have to be documented in a defect list
and are to be transferred to defect management.
D. Communicating about Anomalies
The relationship between the different concepts of
Section IV-A can be used to communicate about the
anomalies along different organizational units as follows:
The customer got a Problem caused by a failure (a
failed function which is required, which is promised with a
value proposition), indicating the presence of a permanent,
intermittent or transient fault (activated by customer context
of use). The fault has to be detected and a fault reaction has
to be executed to transfer the system into a controlled state.
The fault is indicating the presence of a defect, which has
to be assigned to a subset of components and is intended to
be removed by a completed defect correction (of a corrective
SMR).
V. CASE STUDY
We evaluate quality in use of the concepts by applying
them to the postmortem analysis of the IoT solution. This
section provides an abstract description of the IoT solution
and the context of the customer problem. Further, we present
the results of the classification (stage 1) and the results of the
interview analysis (stage 2).
A. IoT System Description
The mission of the IoT solution can be stated as follows:
Generate and provide condition monitoring data of a physical
customer asset to increase efficiency in managing it.
The IoT solution relies on a distributed system architec-
ture, with relation to different stakeholders: customer, solu-
tion provider, cloud infrastructure provider, sensor gateway
provider and sensor provider.
B. Situation
During operations the solution provider was not able to
perceive faults in the effect chains and the instantiation of
a related failure of the complex IoT system. The customer
notification of failure was the only indicator of faults.
The customer informed the organization, calling the service
desk, that a required function had failed. The incident-specific
problem solving procedure was not initiated before customer
notification. The problem solving procedure ran by the com-
pany, includes the initiation of fault reactions to transfer the
system into a controlled state. A team of specialists, repre-
senting the stakeholders interest, was executing postmortem
analysis, applying the method of 5xWhy to assign root causes.
In the analysis the stakeholders applied our classification for
anomalies to communications.
C. Classification Results - Stage 1
In the following, we describe the results of the case study.
We applied the classification for anomalies to differentiate
between the handling of:
• first, fault detection and fault reaction
in the context of situation management from
• second, defect and its options for defect correction
in the context of defect management.
Problem
• Customer view: customer does not receive up-to-date
asset condition information. Loss of control, with risk
of damage of customer asset.
• Solution provider view: customer perceives that solution
provider lacks competency to control the situation. The
relationship of trust between customer and solution
provider is at risk.
Failure
• Customer (functional system view): failure of solution.
Information related to asset condition inconsistent due to
message transmission fault.
• Provider (functional system view): failure of load
balancer (single point of failure) with fail passive due
to load test on cloud infrastructure. The load balancer
failed by a temporary overload and reacted as expected
by switching to its controlled state4: The system is
down. The server and its service is not available.
Fault (→ fault reaction)
• Customer (dynamic system view) : -
Customer is only offered functional system view. Com-
plexity of dynamic system view is hidden from the
customer.
• Provider (dynamic system view): failure and fault
detection by customers via emergency call to service
desk. The organization did not detect intermittent
transaction message faults. In consequence, there was no
fault reaction. Both, technical (redundancy) as well as
an organizational (manual) fault reaction were missing.
Incident-based problem solving process did not start
until customer calls or sends an email to the service desk.
Defect (→ defect correction option)
Defects related to IoT system (system structure view):
• Defect 1: malconfigured load balancer.
• Defect correction option 1: correction of load balancer
malconfiguration.
Defects related to situation management capability (system
structure view):
• Defect 2: missing technical option for fault reaction of
load balancer (single point of failure): no failing active
and operational, by activating a redundant component.
• Defect correction option 2: implement failing active and
activating redundancy.
• Defect 3: missing organizational options for fault re-
action: no tactical options for situation management.
On organizational level solution provider did not agree
controlled states for degrading the value proposition.
• Defect correction option 3: implement degrading value
proposition including customer information of quality
degradation.
• Defect ...
D. Discussion - Stage 1
With the application of the classification for anomalies, we
identified:
• by differentiating the concepts fault and failure, we
improve in engineering and operating fault tolerant
systems.
4Load balancer is in it’s controlled state – no access – which is optimized
for governance but not for service delivery.
• by differentiating the concepts fault and defect, after
effective fault fixing, we are able to assign a defect to
a component and identify its defect correction options
for transfer to defect management. This is done in effi-
ciency mode to run for efficiency yield. We are customer
oriented. Customer interest is attached to fault fixing and
not to defect correction and decreasing technical dept. We
identified that motivation for defect correction has to be
provided by the organization.
• by differentiating the dynamic system view, we are able
to assign defects related to IoT system and defects related
to capability of situation management.
• during postmortem analysis, we tended to assign the
defect to a single component and not to an interacting
subset of components. Therefore, we forgo correction
options, with higher potential of efficiency yield and
sustainability.
• a need to increase observability in the dynamic system
view with a focus on business process to control adding
value to the customer.
• for having appropriate tactical options in situation
management, additional defects (related to situation
management) can be assigned to a subset of components.
In this case the correction of load balancer malconfiguration
(defect 1) covers defect correction and fault fix. Defect 2, to
eliminate the single point of failure is transferred to backlog.
Improvement to increase fault tolerance as well as improve-
ment to increase capability for situation management have
been identified and are transferred to defect management.
The defect management decides whether and which correction
options are to be executed.
E. Interview Results - Stage 2
This section provides the results of the participant
interviewees where we further investigate the quality in
use (as described in Section II-A) applying our adaptation.
Following the structure of the interview guide, we present
the highest level of the coding system including purpose
of classification for anomalies, the evaluation criteria
(effectiveness, efficiency, satisfaction) and further optimization
potential for our classification. We describe the different
codes with exemplary statements from the stakeholders (S1,
S2 and S3) of the postmortem analysis.
Purpose of classification: At the beginning of each in-
terview, we asked about the purpose of a classification for
anomalies in the context of a postmortem analysis. All of the
three participants described the purpose of it related to existing
challenges.
S1 and S2 outlined from experience with other postmortem
analyses that discussions between different organizational
units are often very imprecise if no shared concepts exist.
Further, S3 stated that: “In deciding conflicts of interest, it
is advantageous to have the power of interpretation over
the concepts of anomalies. This sometimes results in the
rhetorically strongest person taking over the interpretation
sovereignty over the concepts and, for example, directing the
effort for corrections to other organizational units.” In terms
of interpretation sovereignty a classification for anomalies
allows to: “competently exchange about anomalies with
colleagues from other organizational units [...] and thus
ensures that you have a common view on the situation and
the system.” (S2). Further a commonly accepted classification,
acts as “[...] a common language [...]”, that enables to
”[...]improve mutual understanding.” (S2). For “[...] yourself
only you do not necessarily need a classification.” (S2).
It is especially important in order to enable continuous
learning for iterative and inductive product development and
improvement along different organizations. ”This is done via
feedback loops. Learning for “better” is done by excluding
what you do not want to have. Learning for “better” is done
by excluding the anomalies. The challenging communication
about anomalies across organizations is made easier by a
common classification scheme.” (S3). S3 further explicates
that applying the concepts of anomalies enables the linking
of a specific failure in the value proposition to the customer,
into a direct causal relationship of components across silos
and to jointly propose corrections. S1 summarized the benefit
of the adaptation of the classification as follows: “The
differentiation is very important. When I detect a fault, I have
to do a hot fix immediately. It’s very important that I can
get this to work at all. To correct it in a sustainable way,
working on the defect probably makes sense out of a business
perspective.” To proceed with the defects from a business
perspective, reusability of the results of the classification
is necessary and was highlighted by all three stakeholders.
”The information status for a decision, for dealing with the
anomalies is available in a known and reusable schema. It can
be decided quickly and comprehensibly, also at a later time,
whether and how defects to be corrected are transferred back
to development.(S3). S2 confirmed that the differentiation
enables to create a transparent and comprehensive “[...]
documentation that you can pull out even after a year or later
[...].” Hence, the documentation, including detected defects
which may have been graced for economical reasons, can be
used to set up actions for latent faults “[...]at an early stage
or at least you can be aware that something can go wrong,
without it having to go wrong first.”(S2).
Effectiveness: In terms of effectiveness, all three stakehold-
ers of the postmortem analysis confirmed that it is possible
to differentiate between the handling of fault detection and
fault reaction from the handling of defect and its defect
correction options. S2 stated that: “With the classification one
can achieve a high accuracy in differentiation.” Moreover, S1
describes: “The classification enables us to distinguish more
precisely between “quick fix” and sustainable correction.”
All three stakeholders conclude, that the current
organizational framework of the postmortem analysis is
not yet an environment that is sufficiently conducive to
learning. This illustrates the following statement (S1): “I
think it would have been much easier if the organizational
frame would have been different. The questioning of 5xWhy,
was just limited compatible to it. [...] It has disrupted the
regular procedure of the postmortem analysis. Which is
why it was not as efficient and took longer. But in terms of
content it was definitely valuable.” This statement illustrates
that the substantive goal was achieved. Concurrently the
interviewees referred to aspects of time consumption and
degree of difficulty, which brings us to the next evaluation
criteria efficiency.
Efficiency: The interviewees described that the application
of the classification across different stakeholders and organiza-
tions was challenging and complicated. “You have individual
views and a global view, which is presented simplified in
retrospective. But it is not that easy in the analysis process...
in reality it is nested with different responsibilities” (S2).
In addition, S2 noted that at the beginning of an analysis
appropriate data about anomalies at different system levels
is not immediately available. Data can only be transferred
into a form with sufficient information power through several
iterations.
As described in paragraph effectiveness, the efficiency was
limited due to organizational frame. Therefore, we further
discuss the relationship between the efficiency of applying
the classification to the procedure of asking 5xWhy, that was
mentioned by all three stakeholders. S3 reflected that the
application of the 5xWhy method goes beyond the bound-
aries between the effect chain and the tactical fault reactions
during operation, without explicitly differentiating them. As
a consequence: “With troubleshooting, outstanding unwanted
effects “faults” are reacted to with a fault reaction. When
these unwanted effects are under control through a fault
reaction, an interest in further actions related to sustainable
correction decreases, even if the fault reaction has to be
operated persistently.” (S3).
In terms of time consumption our classification performs
worse than the previous postmortem. However, the application
of our classification enabled us to identify faults with fault
reactions and defects with options for sustainable correction.
Therefore, defects related to product 5 (IoT system) quality and
defects related to capability of situation management could be
identified. From a strategic business point of view, the concepts
of anomalies consequently allow to weigh up in present and
also at a later stage in which activities are to be invested.
Further S3 highlighted that use of resources must be con-
sidered in relation to the effect achieved. “Symmetry and
reuse of work is not the primary optimization goal of those
who are involved in an postmortem analysis”. This is where
S3 identified a high potential for return on efficiency (see
paragraph further Optimization).
Throughout the interviews, we identified that in order
to increase the time efficiency of the application further
practical executions are needed. We assume that the
5For this work, a service is also a product.
effort of applying the classification decreases with increasing
usage and therefore in turn efficiency can be further increased.
Satisfaction: All of the three stakeholders of the
postmortem analysis stated to have a positive attitude towards
the logic of the classification. S1 describes to feel secure in
applying our concepts of anomalies and moreover to further
distribute it across his team: “I like it a lot. That’s why I use
the concepts and terminology in our team. Also to get people
used to it, because I think its value adding.” S3 commented
the question of satisfaction by relating it to cultural aspects of
performing postmortem analysis: “What I particularly like, is
the fact that the classification refers to anomalies in the IoT
system and not to people who are to blame for something.”
S1 and S3 reflected on feeling confident in the application of
the concepts. Uncertainty arose when participants noticed that
other colleagues either had not understood the classification
or worse, when the colleagues refused to differentiate due to
mental effort, or in the course of transparency that was not
intended. S2 added that: “[...] indeed, one can hardly resist
against the logic of the classification”.
Further Optimization: We identified that the classification
can be a foundation for an analysis that is not focused on
blaming. However, it is not the solution to the cultural problem
(S1): “With the concept you can also look for “culprits” just as
well as with the postmortem analysis before. At the end of the
day it is crucial, what is done with the result of the analysis.”
S2 also discussed this point and stated: ”If you disassemble
everything in detail and you take a close look at what went
wrong and where a defect is located, that is what people do
not really enjoy. At this point you have to be especially careful
not to be destructive.”
S3 reflected how the execution of the 5xWhy in combination
with the classification could be improved in terms of efficiency
(S3): “Once the defect is detected or reported, so as assigned
to a subset of components in arrangement, asking “why” can
be stopped. Which option for correction is finally executed,
can be strategically planned outside of the postmortem anal-
ysis meetings, in the efficiency paradigm. Currently, in the
postmortem meetings the options for correction are “quickly
found”... regardless of whether these corrections find a higher
strategic use.”
It turned out that further improvement on training the clas-
sification, including practical instructions on how to apply it
on a real-world customer problem are necessary. At this point
it has to be ensured that people are not “[...] overwhelmed
with the differentiation” (S2).
F. Discussion - Stage 2
The answers of the participants indicate, if the adaptation of
the classification for anomalies is established and sufficiently
practiced, it has the potential to be not only effective but also
efficient. Misunderstandings in communications across differ-
ent organisational units or silos can be drastically reduced.
In addition, the reusability of the results of the classification
fosters a continuous learning culture for iterative and inductive
product development and operation.
Furthermore, the application of our concepts of anomalies is
still challenging in varying degrees to the different stakehold-
ers. “The colleagues with contact to the customer identified a
benefit for themselves and quickly completed communication
and thinking with the concepts that were new to them.” (S3).
We assume that this is the case because the interest group in
contact to the customer has the highest intention to create an
overall view to control their value proposition. Further they
have a high interest that defects are sustainably corrected to
avoid further failures in their value provision to the customer.
For teams at infrastructure level, with a more complex and
dynamic view of the system, it is difficult to relate a fault and
the related defect at the infrastructure level with a failures
at the application level as described in an interview study
from 2019 on observability and monitoring of distributed
systems [1].
We conclude that there is a need to focus on the organiza-
tional frame and on training of our classification for anomalies.
The improvement of efficiency includes practical instructions
in how to apply the classification for anomalies and how to
improve its integration in the company specific procedure of
the postmortem analysis.
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY
Since we performed interviews for evaluating the quality
in use of our classification, we anticipate some personal bias
in the answers from the interviewees as threat to internal
validity. To minimize this threat, we triangulated the answers
of one interview of each stakeholder group. Further, the results
of the classification have been classified and confirmed by the
different stakeholders. We also compared the answers given
in the interview with the observation of the classification
meetings. Therefore, we consider the threat to internal validity
has been further reduced.
Concerning external validity, we identified a risk that the
classification and the results are specific to the case company
context of Bosch. Hence, as we documented our adaptation
on the IEEE Std. 1044-2009 for the system level as well as
described the case context, we assume that our results can
be generalized to similar IoT contexts outside of this specific
case. We could further decrease this threat by applying it to
other postmortem analysis and compare the results.
Since we have described the procedure of data collection
and analysis, we consider that the study can be reproduced
and a threat to reliability has been reduced. However, specific
details about the incident report are sensitive and cannot be
provided.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Building and operating IoT systems in open system context
needs iterative and inductive learning to improve products.
This is enabled by excluding unwanted effects in dynamics of
customer context of use by automated fault reaction or defect
correction. To collaborate along different product teams and
organizations an ontology providing concepts of anomalies is
needed. With this work, we proposed and applied an adaptation
of the IEEE Std. 1044-2009 for classifying system anomalies
according to three architectural views: functional, dynamic and
system structure view. Our adaptation allows to differentiate
between the handling of fault detection and fault reaction in
the context of situation management from the handling of
defects and their defect correction options in the context of
defect management. We have evaluated the quality in use with
the quality sub-characteristics of effectiveness, efficiency and
satisfaction of our adaptation by applying it to a postmortem
analysis at Robert Bosch GmbH.
In terms of effectiveness we were able to differentiate
between the concepts of failure and fault. This enabled us
to identify missed fault reactions for controlling the system to
keep the customer’s trust during situation management and
lets us improve fault tolerance and capability for situation
management in future. Moreover, we were able to differentiate
between the concepts of fault and defect. This enabled us
a differentiation between the actions for tactical fault fix
from actions for sustainable defect correction. In addition, the
results of the postmortem analysis with the classification for
anomalies are available in a reusable scheme and allow us to
decide whether and how defects have to be corrected.
The efficiency of applying our classification was limited.
The stakeholders described the application of the classification
across different organizations as challenging, also due to the
organizational frame. However, all interviewees highlighted
the valuable content-related contribution. We anticipate that
the effort and time of applying the classification will decrease
with increasing usage to further improve efficiency.
The overall satisfaction of applying the classification was
positive. The stakeholders stated a positive attitude towards
the constructive usage of the concepts, in order to foster
continuous learning. The classification can be foundation but
will not be solution to difficulties in terms of silo mentality.
We identified that in industry there is a focus on the
functional system view on the “happy path”. A dynamic
system view, to control temporal effects, which enables fault
detection and fault reaction is often missing. To be able to
implement tactical options for fault reaction, we identified the
need to enhance a system modelling.
In order to sufficiently react to anomalies and keep the
system in a controlled state performing operations, we have to
observe and quantify the dynamic behaviour to indicate and
detect faults. Therefore, we work on methods for observing
anomalies to indicate and detect faults along the component-
effect chains of a service throughout different organizational
units, performing development and operations. This should
allow us to improve fault tolerance of complex IoT systems.
We think practitioners as well as researchers can take these
concepts into account in the development of collaborative
concepts in handling system anomalies along different orga-
nizational units.
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